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Abstract: I take up the challenge of why false beliefs are better than
“cautious action policies” (target article, sect. 9) in navigating adaptive
problems with asymmetric errors. I then suggest that there are
interactions between supernatural beliefs, self-deception, and positive
illusions, rendering elements of all such misbeliefs adaptive. Finally,
I argue that supernatural beliefs cannot be rejected as adaptive simply
because recent experiments are inconclusive. The great costs of
religion betray its even greater adaptive benefits – we just have not yet
nailed down exactly what they are.
The greatest challenge to McKay & Dennett’s (M&D’s) argu-
ment is why false beliefs are necessary to achieve adaptive behav-
ior – why not (as M&D note in sect. 9, para. 2) just have
“cautious action policies” instead? I don’t believe this problem
was completely resolved in the target article, so I tackle it with
reference to the “supernatural punishment hypothesis”
(Johnson 2009; Johnson & Bering 2006; Johnson & Kru¨ger
2004), since the same problem haunts that hypothesis as well.
The argument is that the costs of selfishness increased when
humans evolved language and Theory of Mind (ToM), because
social transgressions became much more likely to be detected
and punished. Supernatural punishment offered a cautionary
mind-guard to reduce selfishness and avoid real-world costs.
But why bring God into it? A Darwinian perspective suggests
that atheists could simply develop a “cautious action policy” –
becoming more prudent about when to be selfish. A first line
of defense comes from M&D’s categories of evolutionary limit-
ations: (1) economics – a fear of supernatural agency may have
been biologically cheaper or more efficient; (2) history – a
capacity for supernatural beliefs may have been more readily
available, given the prior evolution of ToM; (3) adaptive land-
scape – fear of detection and punishment by supernatural
agents may have been a small step up the local fitness peak
from fear of detection and punishment by human agents.
A stronger line of defense is that, while a cautious action policy
might work in principle, the whole point of error management
theory is that it pays to overestimate the probability of detection,
not to get it right or to weigh up the costs and benefits “rationally”
(Haselton & Buss 2000; Haselton & Nettle 2006; Nettle 2004).
Believing (irrationally) that supernatural agents are watching is
a good way to ensure systematic overestimation of the actual
risk of detection and punishment (by other human beings;
Johnson 2009). The power of religion appears to stem precisely
from its irrational and non-falsifiable features (Rappaport
1999), and empirical data suggest that religious beliefs are
more effective at promoting group survival than similar but
non-religious beliefs (Sosis & Bressler 2003). Cautious action
policies might work in reducing selfishness, but they may not
be as effective as God.
My next concern is that supernatural agency, self-deception,
and positive illusions are treated as independent phenomena,
with only positive illusions making the cut for an adaptive misbe-
lief. However, there are important interactions between these
three phenomena that make elements of all of them adaptive.
First, self-deception is essential to many supernatural beliefs.
If supernatural punishment is to affect people’s behavior, they
must believe in it – despite lacking any direct evidence whatso-
ever and despite having to ignore counter-evidence. This is
classic self-deception (Trivers 2000). Interestingly, this
self-deception can be reinforced by the belief itself – in many
religions, it is common for someone’s misfortune to be treated
as evidence of wrongdoing, since gods or spirits “evidently”
punished the victim (Bering & Johnson 2005).
Second, self-deception is essential to many positive illusions.
For example, positive illusions have been suggested to be adap-
tive in conflict, bluffing superior power or skill to deter opponents
(Johnson 2004; Trivers 2000; Wrangham 1999). Self-deception is
essential here to avoid “behavioural leakage” that would other-
wise give the game away (nervous Nellies are less convincing
bluffers than cool-hand Lukes). This may be why, as Daniel
Kahneman notes, “all the biases in judgment that have been
identified in the last 15 years tend to bias decision-making
toward the hawkish side” (quoted in Shea 2004). Positive illusions
appear to be advantageous enough that numerous psychological
biases converge to promote them despite the evidence.
Third, supernatural beliefs may be an example of positive
illusions. As M&D note, people often cite God as giving them
“the strength to go on.” If health or fitness advantages derive
from such beliefs, then religious beliefs are adaptive according
to M&D’s own criteria. Religious beliefs may involve all three
types of positive illusions: positive self-evaluations (God chose
me/us), illusions of control (God will help me/us in difficult
times), and optimism about the future (God has a plan; Heaven
awaits). Similar beliefs are common among the world’s numerous
religions.
My final concern is M&D’s rejection of supernatural beliefs as
adaptive, which hinges on a perceived lack of empirical evidence.
This is problematic for three reasons. First, in the literature
M&D focus on, researchers tend to use religious primes
derived from Western Judeo-Christian traditions (e.g., “divine,”
“God,” and “prophet” in Shariff & Norenzayan 2007), whereas
the relevant supernatural concepts in our evolutionary history
could be anything from dead ancestors, spirits, ghosts, witches,
inanimate objects, and so forth. Similarly, modern religious
agents are only one possible type of supernatural agency,
whereas subjects’ behavior may also be influenced by other
sources such as superstition, folklore, karma, Just World beliefs
(the belief that victims of tragedy somehow deserved it), or every-
day “comeuppence” and “just deserts.” Given this diversity of
possible supernatural agents and sources, personal religious
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affiliations and devoutness among experimental subjects may be
somewhat independent of how supernatural beliefs – in
general – influence people’s behavior (M&D predict an inter-
action of personal religious devoutness and behavior). Current
experiments may not, therefore, be able to differentiate the be-
havior of “believers” and “non-believers” – Joe Bloggs may be
an avowed atheist who, on his way to Las Vegas, is nevertheless
very concerned about seeing a black cat or wearing his lucky
jacket or what his grandmother would have said.
Second, even if we had incontrovertible evidence that super-
natural cues (e.g., via experimental primes) promoted higher
donations in economic games, this is far from evidence that reli-
gious beliefs are biologically adaptive. On the contrary, it could
be evidence that religious primes turn people into suckers who
give away precious resources. Such behavior, on its own, would
not survive natural selection – without additional field exper-
iments measuring fitness consequences, evidence for altruism
is hardly evidence of an adaptive trait. Therefore, the (excellent)
current laboratory experiments that M&D focus on cannot yet be
used as deal-breakers as to whether (mis)belief is adaptive or not.
Third, having rejected supernatural beliefs as adaptive, M&D’s
null hypothesis is that religious beliefs are a non-adaptive
byproduct of cognitive mechanisms adapted for other purposes –
evolutionary accidents, in other words. However, if religious
beliefs are accidental byproducts, we might expect natural selection
to have eradicated them because (as M&D note) they impose sig-
nificant fitness costs in terms of time, effort, and resources (Sosis &
Alcorta 2003). So why do they persist?
Even if some religious beliefs persist as “sticky” cultural para-
sites, it does not preclude them from also promoting individual or
group fitness at certain times or contexts (in which case they may
not be “parasites”). The universality and power of religious
beliefs of some form or other – despite their costs – to billions
of people around the world, every culture in history, and every
hunter-gatherer society, strongly suggests that religion confers
adaptive fitness benefits, for individuals and/or groups (at least
in some contexts, for some people, and for some periods of
human history). Of course, universality need not imply adap-
tation: other non-adaptive traits such as chins and male nipples
are also globally and historically universal. However, they do
not impose significant costs. Religion does.
The only theories that solve this paradox are religion-as-adaptive
hypotheses that propose how costly (mis)beliefs beget even greater
benefits for individuals and/or groups (Johnson 2008; Norenzayan
& Shariff 2008; Sosis & Alcorta 2003; Wilson 2002), or are
outweighed by the costs of non-belief (Cronk 1994; Johnson
2009; Johnson & Bering 2006). Byproduct theories of religion
offer no solution to its greatest puzzle, for God would be a costly
accident.
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